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Introduction

Unsolicited e-mail accounts for over 80 percent of all Internet e-mail
traffic, which amounts to over 1.6 billion messages per week.1 15 percent
of these unsolicited e-mails are stock touts. 2 Stock-touting spam invites a
user to invest in a specific stock, and often concedes in its fine print that the
spammer has a financial interest in touting those stocks.3 When users invest
in a stock in which the spammer (or the spammer's client) holds a stake,
spam recipients can maintain or drive up the price while the spammer is
selling so that the stock can be liquidated at a profit. 4 For example, in a
well-known case brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), it was found that stock touter Jonathan Lebed routinely purchased
stock accounting for anywhere from 17 percent to 46 percent of the stock's
market volume for a day and sent spammed e-mail touts on the same day.
He then lodged limit orders to sell for the next day's trading session,
anticipating a rise in the stock price after the general public received his

1. Associated Press, U.N. Wants to Slam Spam, CBS NEWS, July 6, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/06/tech/main627736.shtml?source=search-story .

2. See Postini, http://www.postini.com/stats (last visited Apr. 2, 2008). See also Sophos,
Sophos Security Threat Management Report 2-5 (2006), availableathttp://www.sophos.com/
sophos/docs/eng/papers/sophos-security-report-jun06-srus.pdf;
Spam-o-Meter, Statistics by
Percentage, http://www.junk-o-meter.com/stats/index.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
3. See Robert Lemos, Spammers Get Bullish on Stocks, Jan. 12, 2007,
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11435. See also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Internet Fraud:
How to Avoid Internet Investment Scams, http://www.sec.gov/investor/ pubs/cyberfraud.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2008).
4. See
ConsumerFraudReporting.org,
Stock
Alert
Scams,
http://
www.consumerfraudreporting.org/stock-scams.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
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touts and some recipients acted on them. 5 Lebed's case and subsequent
settlement with the SEC focused on his failure to disclose his own financial
interest in the securities he touted.6 As is discussed below, stock touts today
often include such disclosures.
We conducted a study by matching price and volume data from Pink
Sheets, LLC to ticker symbols that appeared in e-mail touts received by one
of the authors and by the moderated Internet Usenet newsgroup
news.admin.net-abuse.sightings ("NANAS") between January of 2004 and
July of 2005, and comparing the presence and volume of spain touting
particular stocks with the price and volume behavior of those stocks before,
during, and after the touts. The stocks in the sample tended to be touted
over several days, and we found that, on average, there was a significant
increase in stock price from the day before touting began to the day with
the most active touting. Volume also responded positively and significantly
to heavy touting. Returns in the days following touting were significantly
negative.
The touted stocks in our sample are nearly always listed on the Pink
Sheets market, and sometimes they are also listed on the Over the Counter
Bulletin Board market ("OTCBB").7 They are not listed on any major
exchange, nor are they traded in large total dollar amounts, making them
amenable to manipulation. Any mispricing created by trading made in
response to touting may persist since liquidity risk in these stocks is high.
The type of arbitrage in which stock-touting spammers engage would not
likely succeed in the absence of a tout-created market. Researchers have
no direct way of knowing if a spammer actually has holdings in the
spammed stock unless the spammer admits to ownership. When evidence
of ownership is available, it accords with the hypothesis that spammers tout
stocks in order to increase trading activity and price enough to unload their
positions at a profit. Selling pressure on the part of the spanmer then
results in negative returns following heavy touting. These results are
consistent with the model that suggests that, in highly illiquid markets (like
Pink Sheets), traders with significant liquidity needs have an incentive to
take costly
actions that increase liquidity and decrease the impact of their
8
trades.

5.
6.

See In re Lebed, 73 SEC Docket 741, 2000 WL 1353040, at *1-2 (Sept. 20, 2000).
Id. at * 1-3.

7. For example, the stock China World Trade Corporation ("CWTD") is listed on the Pink
Sheets market. See PinkSheets.com., http://www.pinksheets.com/ pink/quote/quote.jsp?symbol=
CWTD#getQuote (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
8. See generally Harrison Hong & Ming Huang, Talking Up Liquidity: Insider Trading and
Investor Relations, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 22, 25 (2005).
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Spam is relatively
relationships between
spammers and virus authors have resulted in millions of virus-infected
personal computers being harnessed as "zombies" to send spam,' 0 which
further lowers the cost to send spam. In addition, unlike most other
commercial spam, stock touts do not call for any direct (and therefore
traceable) Internet-mediated reply from the person spammed, such as the
sending of money to purchase a "spamivertised" product." Stock-touting
spammers are therefore particularly difficult for private anti-spam consortia
or public authorities to identify and punish-further reducing the cost of
sending such spam. Stock touts, however, do call for action by their
recipients, in the form of purchases placed in financial markets. 12 If the
volume of such purchases is high enough, it ought to be reflected in the
price and/or volume information recorded for that market. Stock-touting
spam thus provides a unique way to measure how effective spam can be.
A connection between touting and short-term price movements or
volume suggests inefficiency in some parts of the securities market, with
trading taking place not on the basis of underlying fundamentals, but rather,
on the basis of misconceptions of some of those spammed with toutspeople who not only read their spam and believe its contents, but who then
undertake the effort to issue instructions to a broker to purchase the touted
stock. Additionally, the inexpensive per share prices of Pink Sheets' stocks
might attract amateur investors to this market. We find that the monetary
value of the affected transactions that take place on Pink Sheets is generally
small compared to that on the major exchanges-or to other notable

9. See generally Katherine Wong, The Future of Spam Litigation after Omega World
Travel v. Mummagraphics, 20 HARv. J.L & TECH. 459 (2007) (discussing incentives for sending

spam).
10. For a further discussion of zombies, see Virus Writers Turn to Spam, BBC NEWS, July
30, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3107613.stm; Spam Virus 'Hijacks' Computers,
BBC NEWS, June 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2987558.stm.
11. For example, scams that do require a direct, Intemet-mediated reply include phishing,
debt collection, fake bills, and Nigerian money transfer scams.
See, e.g.,
ConsumerFraudReporting.org, Money Transfer and Bank Account Frauds - So-called Advance
Fee Fraud, "Nigerian", "419" and "Dutch" Scams, http://www.consumerfraudreporting.org/
nigerian.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2008); ConsumerFraudReporting.org, What to Do If You Are
Contacted
by
a
Debt
Collector
and
You
Don't
Owe
Debt,
http://
www.consumerfraudreporting.org/debtcollectionscams what to do.php (last visited Apr. 2,
2008);
ConsumerFraudReporting.org,
Fake
Bills
Pro
Forma
Invoicing,
http://www.consumerfraudreporting.org/fakebilling.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2008); HoaxSlayer.com, Phishing Scams - Anti-Phishing Information, http://www.hoax-slayer.com/phisherscams.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
12. See Spamnation, Stock Spam FAQ, http://spamnation.info/stocks/FAQ.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2008). See also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 3.
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methods of market manipulation.1 3 This makes a case for regulatory
prioritization more difficult, even though touting is a phenomenon that may
affect the most vulnerable of investors. Given the growth in the number of
inexperienced individuals in the market, the potential for abuse is
significant even as the dollar value in a given cycle of spamming is less
than $100,000.
The successes of spain-touting that we documented do, however, raise
questions about the right scope and depth of government-sponsored
consumer protection in an era in which the Internet has enabled both the
ready reception of stock touts and the corresponding one-click investing by
amateurs who previously needed brokers or other intermediaries to temper
actions arising from their susceptibility to scams. Many of the stock-touting
e-mails that we examined contained disclosures that the spammer would4
sell his or her own shares contemporaneously with the spam campaign.1
The inclusion of these disclaimers is perhaps a result of a campaign by the
SEC in 2000 to crack down on stock-touting by those who failed to
disclose their own holdings in the touted stocks. 15 Regulatory regimes that
rely on investors to rationally weigh the required disclosures of information
may prove ineffective when the investors in question clearly disregard the
disclosures that are present.
Finally, successful sparn-touting calls into question the very notion
that spam is in fact unwanted by the recipient. Recipients may wish to
avoid spam generally, but at least some part of the Internet public appears
to be hungry for investment advice and information, enough so as to absorb
and follow advice that is flatly against its interest and delivered in one of
the most reviled formats of the information age. 16 In this respect, our results
are consistent with Merton, who, based on the observation that individual
and institutional investors each hold just a small proportion of the universe

13. See Stock Spam FAQ, supra note 12; Michael Brush, Hoping for Green in the Pink
Sheets, but Seeing Red, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9F01E6DD1639F936A1575BCOA960958260; James J. Angel et al., From
Pink Slips to Pink Sheets Liquidity and Shareholder Wealth Consequences of Nasdaq Delistings
(Nov. 2, 2004), available at http://www.bus.wisc.edu/finance/pdfs/ Seminar/Spring2005/Angel_
HarrisPanchapagesan_Werner_2004 Nov 02.pdf.
14. See infra Fig. I (E-mail from "Johnathon I. Hathaway" to Jonathan Zittrain, author
(Mar. 18, 2004, 13:09:47 GMT) (on file with author))).
15 See Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, "You've Got Jail": Current Trends in Civil
and Criminal Enforcement ofInternet Securities Fraud, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 405, 405-10
(2001).
16. See, e.g., Spammers Manipulate Stock Markets, BBC NEWS, Aug. 25, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5284618.stm; Bina Brown, Investors Target of Spain and
Scam, CNN.COM, June 26, 2006, http://editionl.cnn.com/2006/BUSfNESS/06/12/ btn.scams/
index.html.
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of traded equities, assumes that investors only invest in those securities
with which they are familiar. 17 Indeed, touting a stock via spain is a
mechanism by which a spammer can make a potential investor aware of a
previously unknown company. 18 Given that most firms listed on Pink
20
19
Sheets are unknown to most investors, professor Robert Merton's
recognition hypothesis lends itself well to the theory that spammers tout
obscure stock in order to draw attention to that stock.2' Our method cannot
directly expose investor intent or behavior. Instead, we show that markets
move in response to spamming efforts. This suggests that enough people
fail to filter spain, read it, and then act upon it, thus making spamming
worthwhile. Evidence that touting stocks by spam "works" under the right
circumstances helps to complete the puzzle of why spain is so
voluminous.
This article proceeds as follows: Section II reviews data and our
method; Section III presents the results; Sections IV and V provide a
discussion of the results and consider their policy implications; and Section
VI provides a conclusion.
II. Literature Review, Data, and Method
A.

Literature Review

Previous literature, discussed below, has analyzed investor response to
new information. For example, when studying earnings surprises, finance
professor Charles Lee found that individual investors tend to buy stock in
reaction to the release of news, regardless of whether the news is positive
or negative. 23 This suggests that small investors may place more weight on
the mere presence of news than on its content. Brad Barber and Terrance
Odean, professors of finance who have focused on investor behavior, find
that individual investors buy significantly after "attention-drawing" events,
such as a news release about a given company or a day that a stock
17. See generally Robert Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with
Incomplete Information, 42 J. FIN. 483 (1987).
18. See generally id.
19. See David Milstead, For Maximum Risk, Trade on Pink Sheets, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2007, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/20O7/dec/15/ for-maximumrisk-trade-on-pink-sheets/.
20. Robert Merton is the J.C. Professor of Management at the A.P. Sloan School of
Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
21. See generally Merton, supra note 17.
22. See infra Section IV & V.
23. See Charles M. Lee, Earnings News and Small Traders: An Intraday Analysis, 15 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 265 (1992).
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experiences an extreme abnormal return; the stocks that such investors
purchase often subsequently underperform those that they sell.24 Business
school professors Werner Antweiler from the University of Minnesota and
Murray Frank from the University of British Columbia studied the market
response to messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull message
boards about Dow Jones Industrial Average companies. 25 They show that,
besides predicting increased trading, significant postings about a stock are
followed by statistically significant negative returns.2 6 This result suggests
that many individuals who act on news-at least that posted on message
boards-trade at a disadvantage, if they are not acting outright irrationally.
Finance professors Michael Cooper, Orlin Dimitrov, and P. Rau built upon
this theory,27 and showed that, by reacting to "information" that is not
relevant to a firm's risk or fundamental value (in particular, purchasing
shares of a stock that added ".com" to its name during the Internet boom),
investors cause predictable patterns in volume and returns.2 8 Economics
professors Roland Benabou and Guy Laroque showed that some insiders
and others with privileged information can manipulate markets through
distorted announcements because it can be difficult for investors to
determine whether such announcements are true, and because investors are
especially attuned to announcements from seemingly credible sources.29
While this literature examines investors' responses to news and
information that they seek to obtain, this article examines investors'
responses to news that broader audiences passively receive and that is of
apparently no substantive validity. In this Article, we look at stock-touting
that does not purport to or appear to come from a credible source, and that
is sent through a channel-e-mail spam-that is not a typical means for the
corporate communication of financial data. 30 For market manipulation
generally, management professors Rajesh Aggarwal of the University of

24. See Brad Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 790-800, 802-04

(2000).
25. See generally Werner Antweiler & Murray Z. Frank, Is All That Talk Just Noise? The
Information Content of Internet Stock Message Boards, 59 J. FIN. 1259 (2004).
26. Id. at 1259-60.
27. See generally Michael Cooper et al., A Rose.com by Any Other Name, 56 J. FIN. 2371,
2376-80, 2382-84 (2001).
28. Id.
29. See generally Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, Using Privileged Information to
ManipulateMarkets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility, 107 Q. J. ECON. 921 (1992).
30. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 3; Press Release, SEC., SEC Takes Another
Bite Out of E-mail Spain with Three More Trading Suspensions (Oct. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-212.htm.
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Minnesota and Guojun Wu of the University of Houston created a model of
market manipulation not specific to any particular means and found that
manipulated stocks are less liquid and smaller than non-manipulated
3
stocks, and are often listed it markets like OTCBB and Pink Sheets. 1
Concurrent working papers by professors Rainer Bohme from
Dresden University of Technology and Thorston Holz from the University
of Mannheim and professors Michael Hanke and Florian Hauser from the
Innsbruck University School of Management analyzed the relationship
between spammed stock touts and market movements. 32 Below we
compare our results and methods to theirs. Additionally, some Internet
users have tracked the performance of the stocks for which they received
spam touts to see what happens to the value of the stock in the period
around the spamming.33
B.

Spam Data

To perform our analysis, we extracted stock-touting spain messages
from a large quantity of unsorted spam. Our initial data set consisted of a
database of 1,802,016 span messages culled from two sources: 26,273
messages were from the collected spam of one of this paper's authors, and
1,775,743 were retrieved from the Internet usenet newsgroup
news.admin.net-abuse.sightings ("NANAS").3 4 We first automatically

31. See generally Rajesh Aggarwal & Guojun Wu, Stock Market Manipulation - Theory
and Evidence (AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings, Working Paper Series, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=474582.
32 See generally Rainer Bohme & Thorsten Holz, The Effect of Stock Spain on Financial
Markets (Workshop on the Economics of Information & Security 2006, Working Paper),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/ abstract=897431; Michael Hanke & Florian Hauser, On the
Effects of Stock Spam E-mails (Aug. 30, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.itax.at/pdf/hanke.pdf.
33. See, e.g., Spam Stock Tracker - Tracking Penny Stocks Hyped in Spam,
http://www.spamstocktracker.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2008); A.D. Freudenhein, Over-theCounter, Down for the Count (or Variations on the Theme of "I Hate Spam"),
http://www.thetruthasiseeit.com/Archive/2004/2004 02 08.html (last visited Apr.2, 2008);
Leonard Richardson, Stock Spare Effectiveness Monitor, http://www.crummy.com/features/
StockSpam/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
34. NANAS is used for the purpose of alerting network administrators to spam in progress
so that they might take action against it. Its archives contain time-stamped reports of sparn from
Internet users around the world. Reports to NANAS may result in actions against the spanmer. If
such actions reduce the amount of identical spam in a batch reaching other recipients, it could
reduce the effectiveness of stock-touting spam, making our results understated in comparison to
spam that eludes NANAS reporting. While other stock spain may therefore have a larger market
impact, the impact of NANAS may be limited, since spammed stock touts appear to be intended
for immediate consumption against which subsequent filtering is ineffective. There is no way to
assure that NANAS's archive is a representative cross-section of spain from around the world,
but its contributors are found worldwide. Judgments can be made within the NANAS group
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extracted messages that appeared to be stock touts. The extracted messages
met two conditions: (1) the message contained the word "stock," and (2)
the message contained a ticker symbol-like word. Ticker symbol-like
words were defined as sequences of four uppercase letters that were not
common English words or abbreviations. 35 Through this procedure we
identified 75,415 messages containing 28,803 different symbol-like words
dated between August 22, 2000, and August 2, 2005. The messages
scanned were plain text rather than graphical image spain, which has
become prevalent since 2005, presumably to foil spam filters attempting to
scan text.
Next we identified which of these 75,415 messages were actual touts
and what stocks were being touted. We reviewed the messages by hand
because the automated process was prone to identifying false positives.
For example, many of the messages identified were not actual touts, and
many messages touting only one stock contained several symbol-like
words. In the author's spain we found that only ten of all of the spammed
tickers were listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and that the bulk of the
tickers we analyzed were not. We therefore chose to exclude these from our
analysis and focused on stocks in less liquid markets. Thus, we composed a
list of ticker symbols of all companies listed on the Pink Sheets and
OTCBB markets (4,741 and 3,388 securities, respectively), and we
considered only messages containing those symbols.
Rather than look at each message individually, we grouped messages
by date of receipt and symbol.36 We hand processed 7,347 groups of
messages, and found that 3,813 groups were actual touts. Because price
data was not available for all the stocks we identified, our final list was
reduced to 3,669 symbol-date groups. Of these 3,669 symbol-date pairs, we
found over 500 distinct stocks that were touted, all of which were listed on
Pink Sheets, and at least 186 of which were also listed on OTCBB. Most
were touted infrequently: 373 were touted fewer than 10 different days (of
which, 141 were touted only once), and only 15 stocks were touted 30 or

between stocks touted very little, garnering few span reports, or between stocks touted heavily
enough that multiple reports of the spam are found by different reporters. See Welcome to
(last
NANAS, http://faqs.cs.uu.nl/na-dir/usenet/news-admin-net-abuse-sightings/welcome.html
visited Apr. 2, 2008).
35. In practice, excluding English words and abbreviations was useful, as those words
dominated the data when not excluded, and fewer than 3 percent of ticker symbol names on Pink

Sheets are English words or abbreviations.
36. For example, all messages containing the symbol "CWTD" received on February 13,
2004, were placed into a group, and representative messages were sampled to see if the presence
of the symbol reflected an actual tout. Many messages contained more than one symbol, and so
those messages were placed into multiple groups accordingly.
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more different days. The number of messages in each symbol-date
grouping is also relevant, as touts that were distributed more widely were
likely to make multiple appearances in our database. For the vast majority
of symbol-date pairs, few ;messages were received: out of the 3,813 pairs,
fewer than 10 messages were received for 3,049 pairs (and for 1,489 of
these, only 1 message was received). A substantial number, however, were
touted heavily: for 95 pairs, 50 or more messages were received.37
C.

Stock Data

We also gathered trading data about the spammed stocks in our
sample. All but a handful of the touted stocks are traded on Pink Sheets,
LLC. 38 Pink Sheets is a principal provider of trading information for overthe-counter stocks and bonds not listed with major exchanges or
NASDAQ. 39 Unlike markets for other over-the-counter stocks (e.g.,
OTCBB, which is operated and regulated by the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD")), Pink Sheets neither imposes substantive
standards for the listing of its securities, nor does it regulate the market.4 °
To be quoted on Pink Sheets, a company need only find an SEC-registered
market maker who is a member of the NASD and is willing to quote the
stock. 41 As a lister of stocks that include firms with low capitalization and
day-to-day market volume, 42 Pink Sheets may be an attractive venue for
manipulative activity. Further, some offerings of stock may be modest
enough to not require formal SEC registration and regular reporting. While
Pink Sheets-listed companies are still subject to the requirements of the
securities laws, the absence of registration means that they are more
37. Bohme & Holz and Hanke & Hauser performed similar studies. See generally B6hme &
Holz, supra note 32; Hanke & Hauser, supra note 2. These studies also developed an archive of
stock-touting spam. Both studies drew on the database of sparn e-mails compiled by Leonard
Richardson, who runs a website that automatically compares a given stock span to that stock's
performance on the day of receipt. See Richardson, supra note 33. Richardson describes his stock
spain as a concatenation of his own personally received sparn and spam received by other e-mail
addresses he has created specifically for the purpose of drawing spam. Both B6hme & Holz and
Hanke & Hauser use data from January 2005 through December 2005. The former study uses
21,935 of Richardson's touts, while the latter study does not specify the total number of touts it
examined. See Bohme & Holz, supra note 32, at 4-5; Holz & Hanke, supra note 2, at 5-9. This
Article's tout data was derived from reports of spam of global Internet users in the more
comprehensive NANAS database.
38. PinkSheets, About Pink Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.com/pink/about/index.jsp (last
visited Apr. 2, 2008).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Pink Sheets, Getting Quoted on Pink Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.com/pink/otcguide/
issuers getquoted.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
42. Pink Sheets, supra note 38.
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difficult to oversee. The absence of regular SEC disclosure reports provides
fewer opportunities for prosecution of misleading or incomplete statements
made to investors.4 3 Finally, smaller companies may have fewer resources
to monitor and police unusual trades of their stock in the marketplace.
There has been relatively little research on .Pink Sheets stocks, perhaps
due to the lack of publicly-available, bulk historical trading data. 4 Upon
our request, Pink Sheets provided us with archival data from January of
2004 through July of 2005 on the price, volume, and bid-ask spreads for all
the stocks we found touted in our sample. We did not have ready access to
standardized accounting data on the touted firms, 45 making it nearly
impossible to match firms based on specific characteristics such as bookto-market value.46 Instead, we acquired data on 1,000 randomly selected
Pink Sheets securities. We use this sample as a set of control firms in our
analysis. Because one stock had a price of $130 (whereas the 99th
percentile price of the touted stocks was $8.35), we imposed the
conservative restriction that the price of all control stocks be less than $15
so that the control sample was reasonably aligned with the touted stocks.
After ensuring that none of the randomly selected Pink Sheets stocks were
reported as having touting activity over our sample period, 525 control
stocks remained.47
In reviewing the data, we found that spai touts typically occur in
temporal groups-NANAS reports indicate that touting is on average made

43. Financial data for companies listed on Pink Sheets is limited, though a dealer is required
to examine some of the financial statements before quoting the stock. Thus, for the stocks we
studied, it may be possible to obtain Rule § 240.15c2-11 filings. See Pink Sheets, supra note 41.
Future research might seek to uncover correlations between company financial data and
susceptibility to spammed stock-touting.
44. See generally Johnathan Macey et al., Down and Out in the Stock Market: The Law and
Finance of the Delisting Process (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author and the
Hastings Communicationsand EntertainmentLaw Journal).
45. We first sought to obtain pricing and market data: freely accessible online, but found
sources such as Yahoo! Finance market data to be incomplete. B6hme & Holz encountered the
same problem, and were compelled to reduce their sample size of touted stocks from 391 to 111
tickers (and from 21,935 to 7,606 spam e-mails) because of unavailable data. See Bohme & Holz,
supra note 32, at 4-5, 12-15.
46. B6hme & Holz faced the same problem in finding a suitable market baseline against
which to compare touted stock activity. See id. at 4-5. They chose daily market indices: Standard
& Poor's 500, NASDAQ Composite, and Russell's daily microcap, which includes stocks of
comparatively low liquidity. Id. We chose the approach described in this Article to avoid the
mismatch between these indices and the lightly traded and thus volatile individual stocks that are
the target of touters. For a robustness analysis, we do, however, also compare our data to the
Russell microcap.
47. Later in the analysis, this number is further reduced because price or volume data was
not available for the date of comparison with a touted stock.
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over the course of a few days.48 This may not represent intentional
continuing touts by the spammer, but rather, the fact that much spamming
is perpetrated by "zombie" PCs that are infected with viruses and then
instructed to send the spam.49 Once the spam is sent, the spammer may
have little incentive to retract the original instructions sent to the zombie,
since the zombie's future actions are no longer relevant to a completed
market manipulation scheme.5 °
In our analysis we cluster tout spam that continued for a few days.
We labeled each period of continual touting a group. For example, if a
given stock was touted for three consecutive days, the three days of touting
would be denoted as one group. Similarly, if a stock was only touted on
one day, that day forms its own group. We identified instances of more
than five consecutive trading days without any further touting as the end of
a group (our results are not sensitive to changing the length of this period).
Within each group, we also identify the peak day of touting, represented by
the day with the largest number of recorded touts in that group. Though we
cannot observe the trading behavior of the spammer, for the purposes of
testing whether spanming can be profitable to the touter, we assume that
the peak day of spamming (day zero in the analysis that follows) is the day
on which the spammer directly intended to initiate selling the stock. To the
extent that the day of heaviest touting does not correspond with the day the
spammer planned, since control over e-mail distribution by zombie PCs
may be inexact, the spamier may profit less. In this circumstance,
however, we will see that the correlation between heavy touting and market
behavior remains- the market responds to the actual volume and
concentration of touts as they happen, regardless of when the spammer
intended the touts to happen.
D.

Method

After matching the Pink Sheets price and volume data with the tout
data for each touted stock on the day of the tout, we randomly selected one
stock from the randomly selected set of non-touted Pink Sheets stocks to

48. For the data used in our analysis, see Laura Frieder & Jonathan Zittrain, Stock Touts,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/stockspam/public/index.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
49. See Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, Zombie PCs Spain, Phish, Harass on the Sly,
USATODAY.COM, Sept. 8, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/ 200409-08-zombie-antics_x.htm; Mark Ward, Zombie PCs Growing Quickly Online, BBC NEWS, Feb.
22, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4685238.stm; Wikipedia, Zombie Computer,
http://en.wlkipedia.org/wiki/Zombie-computer (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
See also Posting of John McCormick to
50. See Spamnation, supra note 12.
69
TechRepublic.com, http://blogs.techrepublic.com/security/ ?p=1 (Mar. 4, 2007).

20081

SPAM WORKS

serve as a control stock. 5' The number of observations we made for our
control firms did not exactly match the number of observations for our
touted stocks since Pink Sheets securities are usually thinly traded, 52 and
sometimes not traded at all. If no data was available, we dropped the stock
from the sample. In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the full
sample, the touted stocks, and the control stocks. On average, prices for the
touted stocks were significantly lower than those of the control stocks.
Specifically, the mean price for touted stocks was $0.67, while that for the
control stocks was $0.99. This difference is statistically significant, as
indicated by a t-statistic of -3.19. The share volume for touted stocks,
however, was slightly higher than it was for control stocks (2.88 versus
2.24 thousand, respectively). A t-statistic testing for a difference in mean
volume suggests that this difference is also significant (t = 7.84). For
completeness, we reported the statistics on bid-ask spreads when we could
find them, but these numbers shed little light on the analysis except to
emphasize the frequent illiquidity of the stocks. 53 The spread information is
for unconsummated transactions, and alone does not indicate how much
was paid by a buyer or accepted by a seller for any shares of the stock
analyzed. The standard deviations were enormous, and the means and
medians for price and spreads, in particular, were significantly different.
This date suggests the presence of outliers and a skewed distribution in the
sampling. The next section examines the statistical, as well as the economic
significance of these figures, in an attempt to mitigate the concern that
might accompany such data volatility. Specifically, we use generalized
least squares regressions with clustered standard errors to examine the
relationship between returns and trading activity around touting activity.
Statistical significance persisted despite the presence of such large
deviations.

51. See supra Section I.C.
52. See Milstead, supra note 19; see also Art Kamlet, Trading- Pink Sheets (Sept. 2, 1999),
http://invest-faq.com/cbc/trade-pink-sheets.html; 'PinkSheet' Listing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
1988,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
940DE6DA I73FF933A25756COA96E948260.
53. For data on all verified touts, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. Data on the
bid-ask
spreads
was
obtained
from
the
pink
sheets.
See
Pink
Sheets,
http://www.pinksheets.com/pink/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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Ill. Results
A.

Primary Results

We begin our analysis by examining whether a tout results in
abnormal trading volume. Table 2 shows that it does. To perform this
exercise, we note that we have stocks that are touted at some point during
the sample period (touted stocks), as well as stocks that are never touted
during the sample period (control stocks). Moreover, there are some days in
our sample when no stock is touted (Tout Day = No), and some days in our
sample when there is a stock tout (Tout Day = Yes). Table 2, Panel A
shows the likelihood of a touted or control stock having the greatest dollar
value of trading activity (i.e., price multiplied by volume) on a day when
there is or is no touting.5 4 For our sample, on days when there actually is a
stock tout (Tout Day = Yes), it is much more likely that one of the touted
stocks (as opposed to one of the control stocks) is the stock with the highest
dollar value of trading activity (i.e., 70 percent versus 30 percent). Instead,
on days when there are no touts (Tout Day = No), one of the control stocks
is much more likely to be the most actively traded stock (i.e., 96 percent
versus 4 percent). Table 2, Panel B is similar to Panel A but measures
trading activity in terms of dollar value of abnormal trading activity (price
multiplied by abnormal volume, where abnormal volume is a stock's
volume on day 't' less its mean volume over the sample period,
standardized by mean volume). This panel shows that on days when the
sample stocks are touted, the probability of one of them being the most
actively traded stock is significantly higher than it is for one of the control
stocks (i.e., 74 percent versus 26 percent). On days when there is no
touting activity, it is much more likely that one of the control stocks is the
most actively traded stock (i.e., 63 percent versus 37 percent).5 5 These
results suggest that touting does cause trading activity.

54. To do this analysis we ranked stocks by dollar value of trading activity for each day. We
then formed a new dataset that keeps only the most actively traded stock from each day. We
generated the values in Table 2 by obtaining summary statistics from this new sample for each
type of stock (touted or control) on each type of day (tout day or not). The analysis is done
similarly in Panel B, using dollar value of abnormal trading activity. Note that ranking by
different variables in Panels A and B yields a different number of observations for each type of
stock/type of day.
55. Though one might infer from Table 2 that spammers tout specifically during low
volume periods for their stock, which may also correspond to periods of low trading activity for
the market as a whole, we note that in this initial analysis we do not distinguish between days
with only one tout versus those days with several touts for a given stock. We address this issue
later in the Article.
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We present summary statistics for our touted stocks and the set of
control stocks in Table 3. Again, the number of observations for our control
firms does not exactly match the number for our touted stocks since Pink
Sheets securities are usually thinly traded, and sometimes not traded at
all. 56 If no data was available, we dropped the stock from the sample. To
verify that our results were not driven by thinly traded stocks and bid-ask
bounce,5 7 we also evaluated midpoint returns. Because of the issue with
reported closing spreads discussed above, however, we confirm in
unreported results that these numbers are similar if we simply use closing
prices to calculate returns. Additionally, in the following analysis we
examined return behavior during the two days following the touting
because we anticipated that some investors who receive spam may 58not
purchase the touted stock until the day after they receive the spam-tout.
Over the period from the day before touting activity begins through
the peak day of touting, returns for touted stocks are, on average, 70 basis
points higher per day than they are for control stocks. However, following
the peak day, average returns are 1.06 percent lower per day for touted
stocks. Again, note that these are midpoint returns, so they are unlikely to
be driven by bid-ask bounce. In Section IV, we examine potential profits
and losses to spammers after accounting for anticipated transaction costs.
The difference in returns to touted stocks relative to non-touted stocks
leading up to peak day is significantly positive at the 10 percent level (tstatistic = 1.74) and, subsequent to peak day, this difference is significantly
negative (t-statistic = -3.55). 59Rather than simply compare them to a set of
control stocks, we also consider "benchmark-adjusted" returns. Pink
Sheets stocks are dissimilar from those within the stock indices traded on a
major exchange, so finding an appropriate benchmark with which to adjust
returns was difficult. 60 Nonetheless, we compare returns with the return on

56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. See Alex Frino et al., The Impact of Bid-Ask Bounce on the Measurement of Price
Behaviour Surround Block Transactions on the ASX 3-4 (School of Business, University of
Sidney Working Paper, 2003), availableat http://www.sirca.org.au/Papers/2003037.pdf.
58. We also examine returns only on the following day (as opposed to the following two
days) and find that returns are still significantly lower than they are for the control group.
59. Because we group touts as a single event, we are not concerned about correlation arising
from overlapping observations affecting our results. Nonetheless, in the regressions that follow,
we do correct for possible clustering across observations.
60. See Milstead, supra note 19.
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the Russell Micro-cap Index. 61 Results are qualitatively unchanged, and are
available upon request. 62
A touted stock's volume is significantly higher on the peak day of
touting than it is on days prior to the peak day. The average abnormal
volume increases by over 50 percent from 0.4 during the period before
touting to 0.65 on the peak day of touting. This data suggests that touting
induces trading activity.63 We interpret our results as indicating that
spammers tout the stock in order to encourage buying pressure and trading
activity, making the stock liquid enough to sell.64
Thus far, our results accord with the theory that after a modest but
positive stock price increase (possibly one caused by a spammer's own
anticipatory buying of the sort in which Lebed engaged) spammers tout
stocks. 65 Reflecting sell activity that outstrips spain-induced temporary
demand, returns for touted stocks subsequently fall. Figures 2 and 3,
respectively, depict returns and abnormal volume for the touted and control
stocks in our sample. For touted stocks, the data shows that there is a clear
pattern of returns increasing through the peak day of touting and
deteriorating after that day, while abnormal volume is the greatest on the
day of and the day after the peak day of touting. 66 There is no such pattern
for the control stocks. 67 The negative returns following touting activity may
have nothing to do with the touting per se, but rather, may just be a simple
reversion or price correction after an increase independent of touting
activity. Because of this possibility, we matched each touted stock with
non-touted stocks that have a similar increase in price on the days leading
to peak touting for the touted stocks. Matching our stocks to other Pink
Sheets stocks proved difficult because the stocks are so thinly traded. As an
alternative, we matched each touted stock with one stock from NASDAQ
so that the matched stock is the smallest stock with the most similar price
increase over the relevant days. Because of this construction, the average

61. The index was developed by Russell Investments, which is headquartered in Tacoma,
WA.
See
Russell
Microcap
Index,
http://www.russell.com/ndexes/
characteristics fact sheets/us/RussellMicrocapIndex.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
62. The average beta resulting from a regression of each touted stock's return on the Russell
Micro-cap Index return is statistically and economically indistinguishable from zero.
63. We do not present data on relative spreads in this Table, however, later in the Article we
specifically evaluate a strategy that takes spreads into account. There is little variation in spreads
within a touting "window," and that relative spreads are significantly lower for touted stocks.
64. See generally Malcolm P. Baker & Jeremy C. Stein, Market Liquidity as a Sentiment
Indicator,7 J. FIN. MARKETS 271 (2004) (discussing effects of liquidity).
65. See In re Lebed, 73 SEC Docket 741, 2000 WL 1353040, at * 1-2 (Sept. 20, 2000).
66. See infra Sections IV & V.
67. See id.
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price increase for the NASDAQ stocks leading to the peak day of touting is
statistically indistinguishable from that for the touted stocks. Touted stocks,
however, subsequently and significantly underperform the matched set of
NASDAQ stocks.68 This evidence is consistent with the idea that the
manipulation of trading activity via spain, coupled with selling by
spammers, is what generates a systematic negative return.
Buying by spain recipients is not necessarily evidence that the
recipients believe the tout is true. Investors who attach even a small
probability that price or volume changes are generated by private
information may still trade, which can cause price changes that are
unrelated to fundamentals. 69 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, economics
professors at the University of Pennsylvania and New York University,
respectively, show that a stock promoter, whether informed or uninformed,
can profit so long as investors attach a positive probability to a stock
promoter being an informed trader. 70 As long as an investor believes there
will be some response to touting, he may want to buy even if he knows
spam is uninformative, believing that it is still early in the pyramid scheme
and that other recipients will drive the stock price even higher. Our data
does not allow us to distinguish between this model and one in which much
of the buying is motivated solely by the recipient's belief that the spam
reveals information about a stock's future price movement.
The standard deviation of our price data is high, which reflects the
volatile nature of the Pink Sheets stocks. Because of the stocks' volatile
nature, estimates from our analysis were likely to be noisy. 7I We therefore
ran a pooled cross-sectional generalized least squares regression using all
observations in our sample period and adjusted our statistics for data
clustering. 72 We first examined daily midpoint return as the dependent
variable. The left hand side of Table 4 refers to the full sample (20042005). From Panel A, we see that the coefficient for "#touts," which
represents the number of touts on the day the return is measured, is
significantly positive (0.10 percent). This suggests that each additional tout
is associated with an increase in daily return of 10 basis points.

68. These results are available upon request. Later in this Article, we also match touted
stocks to small NASDAQ stocks by price and trading activity. See Section III.B.
69.

See generally SANFORD GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES (1989).

70. See generally Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation, 5 REv. FIN.
STUD. 503 (1992).
71. See generally Macey et al., supra note 44.
72. In our regressions, we cluster by both ticker and date. That is, we correct for the
possibility that returns on a given date may be correlated across stocks, and that, for a given
stock, returns around touting activity may also be correlated.
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Additionally, looking at what happens in the combined five days after the
tout ("cum5"), we see that subsequent returns are significantly negative (pvalue < 0.0001). The results from the regression are consistent with our
hypothesis for why people spam, and the volume regressions shown in
Panel B appear to provide supporting evidence. The negative coefficient on
the variable "tstk" in the full sample suggests that, on average, touted
stocks have slightly lower abnormal volume than do the control stocks. The
significantly positive coefficient on #touts, however, indicates that touting
does have a significantly positive effect on volume. In this sample,
abnormal volume increases by almost 1 percent with each additional tout.
This abnormal volume associated with touting remains high during the five
days following the touting activity.
We also examined our results in the 2004 and 2005 subperiods (shown
in the respective middle and right hand columns). An interesting pattern
emerges: in 2005 volume reacts significantly more to touting activity.
Abnormal volume increases by 1.16 percent with each additional tout in
2005, but only by 0.68 percent in 2004. Though we expected that the
general public would, over time, learn about spain-touting, and thereby
reduce its reaction to touting, it appears that touters are the ones who have
learned. It is also possible that increased buying by spammees makes it
easier for spammers to sell, which may increase volume further. The fact
that returns on the tout day are not as sensitive to each additional tout (14
basis points in 2004 versus 3 basis points in 2005) is consistent with at least
some of the spammees' buying activity offsetting the spammers' selling
activity, such that the net effect on returns is marginal. An increase in sheer
volume of spain may also account for increased buying. In January 2005,
0.8 percent of spam e-mails were stock touts, and from January 2005
through June 2005, the proportion of sparn that touted stock is said to have
increased by 10 percent per month.73
In Table 5 we further analyze the results in Table 4 by only
considering touted stocks. Since all stocks in this analysis are touted stocks,
we omit the variable tstk from our regressions. Results for daily midpoint
returns and abnormal volume are given in Panels A and B, respectively. As
above, the left hand side of the Table refers to all data (2004-2005), the
middle column provides results for 2004, and the right hand side of the
Table gives results for 2005. The results are similar to those presented in
Table 4: during the full sample period, returns increase by a statistically
73. See Sophos, Sophos Identifies the Most Prevalent Spam Categories of 2005 (Au&. 3,
http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/20O5/08/prjuk 20050803toptive2005),
cats.html; Sophos, Sophos Reveals 'Dirty Dozen' Spam Relaying Countries (July 24, 2006),
http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2006/07/dirtydozjulO6.html.
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significant 9 basis points with each additional tout but are significantly
lower in the days following the tout. Abnormal volume increases by nearly
1 percent with each tout on touted days and remains high following the
tout. Subperiod results for returns and volume follow the same pattern as in
Table 4. The effect of each additional tout on abnormal volume is over 50
basis points greater in 2005, although the effect of each additional tout on
tout day returns is insignificant.
As the data shows, within the group of touted stocks there is great
variation in the amount of touting that takes place, both in sheer number of
messages (as represented by multiple reports of the same spam to NANAS)
and in messages over time.74 Table 6 explores how returns and the overall
economic effect (measured by the dollar value of transactions in a given
day) are affected by the specific amount of spam-touting. This Table tests
the hypothesis that more reports of stock-touting in NANAS on a given day
for a given stock reflects a more successful touting effort by the spammer,
which results in a greater impact on the market for the touted stock. To
evaluate this possibility, we split stock-days into quintiles based on
quantity of touting. Table 6 shows that the average number of touts on a
given day for a given stock is 1 for those stock-days in Quintile 1. By
construction, this number monotonically increases to 31.44 for the quintile
including those stock-days with the greatest amount of touting (Quintile 5).
The average return is not significantly different on the tout day
(presumably because increases in volume are from both spammers and
spammees, or, buyers and sellers, respectively), but both dollar value of
trading activity and dollar value of abnormal trading activity increase
substantially. The Sattherwhite difference in means tests, which
accommodates samples with difference variances, indicates that both the
dollar value of trading activity and the dollar value of abnormal trading
activity are significantly greater for the most actively touted quintile (the
respective t-statistics are 5.0 and 1.84). 7 The fact that the overall dollar
value of transactions roughly increases with touting activity suggests that
the economic effect of touting is larger on those days with more touting
activity. This distinction is important because many Pink Sheets stocks are
penny stocks. Thus, a price increase from, say, $0.01 to $0.03 is 200
percent, whereas a price increase from $1 to $1.05 (which is a greater
dollar increase) is only a 5 percent return. Since it represents the total dollar
size of the stock's market on a given day, the price-multiplied-by-abnormal
volume measure accounts for the fact that lower price stocks can end up

74.
75.

See infra Sections IV & V.
See id.
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with huge returns. Nonetheless, on any given day, there is, on average,
approximately $1,954.69 more traded in strongly touted stocks than in
weakly touted stocks ($3,439.20 versus $1,484.51). Figure 4 depicts the
magnitude of the effect. Table 6, Panel B gives summary statistics on
returns, abnormal volume, and relative spreads for the most actively touted
quintile of stocks. Note that the sample size is greater than one-fifth of the
original sample of tickers because these are the most actively touted stocks,
and any given stock may have more than one observation. In particular, we
see that leading up to the peak day, mean midpoint holding period returns
(from the day before the touting begins to the peak day of touting) are 3.42
percent greater for heavily touted stocks than for control stocks. Thereafter,
however, average returns are roughly 7.61 percent lower for touted stocks.
The increase in abnormal volume on peak day doubles from the period
prior to peak day for touted stocks, whereas abnormal volume for control
stocks actually decreases.
It appears that, despite the volatile and unpredictable behavior of Pink
Sheet stocks, touting activity indeed has explanatory behavior for both
returns and trading activity. It is an empirical regularity that news impacts
liquidity (for example, trading activity increases after earnings
announcements, causing spreads to decrease).76 At the same time, Pink
Sheets is "off the beaten path," in that many investors are unaware of the
existence of most Pink Sheet stocks.77 Our results suggest that one way for
an investor trading on Pink Sheets to change his or her position is to create
liquidity, which is fairly easy to accomplish by attracting attention to the
stock via spain. These results buttress the assumption underlying the
Merton model, which posits that investors only invest in stocks with which
they are familiar. 78 Overall, our results are consistent with the concurrent
working paper by B1hme & Holz, which suggests that a significantly
positive abnormal return accompanies spain messages but disappears
within four days. 79 Our results also are in accord with the findings of Hanke
& Hauser which shows that stock spain affects returns, volume, volatility,
and spreads. 80

76. See generally Baker & Stein, supra note 64; Barber & Odean, supra note 4.
77. See Spamnation, supra note 12; Milstead, supra note 19.
78. See generally Merton, supra note 20.
79. See generally Bohme & Holz, supra note 32.
80. See generally Hanke & Hauser, supra note 32.
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Robustness Checks

We performed several robustness tests on our data. One check
matched the touted stocks in our Pink Sheets sample with stocks in the
smallest decile of NASDAQ firms. These results suggest that in the time
period leading up to the peak day of touting (i.e., in the period "beg 1 to
peak"), touted stocks statistically and economically outperform the control
stocks. Subsequently, however, touted stocks statistically and economically
underperform the control stocks following the peak day of touting (i.e., in
the period "peak to end + 2").
As an additional check, we hand-collected the industry data for each
touted firm in our sample from Pink Sheets. We matched each of these
firms with one from the same industry (determined by 2-digit SIC code)
and repeated the analysis. One interesting result of this comparison was the
distribution of firms across industries. As shown in Table 7, over onequarter of the touted firms (26.63 percent) are in the Business Services
industry. The Communications industry accounts for approximately 7
percent of the sample, as does Engineering, Accounting, Research,
Management, and Related Services. Table 8, Panel A provides information
similar to Table 3, Panel A, but matches our sample's firms by industry.
Using this alternative control group leads to even more significant
results than the group used in the original analysis. Touted firms, on
average, perform over 1 percent better per day during the period "beg - 1 to
peak", while in the period "peak to end + 2", they underperform by
approximately 1 percent per day. The t-statistics testing for a difference in
mean return between these two groups are 3.31 and -3.77, respectively. 81
To check our findings on negative returns, we matched stocks based
on price and abnormal volume on the day preceding the peak day of
touting. We completed this exercise based on the alternative possibility that

81. We also checked whether any of our touted stocks were touted by e-mail sparn on days
that they also appeared on the RagingBull.com message board, using the same method as
Antweiler & Frank. See Antweiler & Frank, supra note 25, at 1264-70. We did this to consider
whether touting may serve as a means to capture investor attention, incremental over the ability of
message boards to do the same. Results for firms that are touted and on RagingBull.com are
available upon request, but suggest that accounting for the overlap between the touted stock
sample and the sample of stocks that are also mentioned on message boards does not qualitatively
alter our findings. We also gathered information from Yahoo! and Silicon Investor. Only two of
our observations overlapped with messages in Yahoo! (by ticker-date), and only scarce news for a
subset of the period studied in our Article was available on Silicon Investor. We also searched
www.google.com, Factiva, and Lexis Nexis for news articles about the companies in our sample
on days the companies were touted, but found no systematic correlation between news and
touting activity.
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82
stocks that have a lot of volume may experience abnormally high returns.
This being the case, a subsequent reversal may just be a result of the stock
"cooling down." Yet, when we perform the analysis by matching similarlypriced NASDAQ stocks that have similar average daily dollar volume
(prior to the touting), the results remain qualitatively unchanged. In
particular, from the day before touting through the peak day of touting,
touted stocks, on average, outperform control stocks by 139 basis points
per day. A t-statistic of 3.49 indicates this difference is significant. From
the peak day of touting through the two-day period after the touting ends,
again, the touted stocks significantly underperform even this set of control
stocks, on the order of 156 basis points per day. This difference is also
statistically significant (t = -4.29).

IV. Discussion
The data presented in Section III suggests not only that some investors
actually do respond to spam stock touts, but that they respond in ways that
affect the overall market for the comparatively illiquid stocks that are the
favorites of spammers. The data show that returns rise with the initial touts
and then fall immediately after. In this Section, we seek to quantify the
magnitude of the effect. For this analysis, we examined the price reactions
to stocks that are "effectively" touted. In particular, for each group of stock
touts, we determined the average daily concentration of touting. If a stock
was touted twelve times in a three-day window, the average concentration
was four; if a stock was touted six times over a six-day period, its average
concentration was one. We then ranked groups by average concentration
and examined return and volume reaction over the touting period for the 50
percent of groups that have the most concentrated touting.
First, let us consider an example from the perspective of the spammer.
To follow this example, refer to Table 9 (sub-panel labeled "beg - 1 to
peak").8 3 For this analysis, we used the stock's daily closing price as
reported by Pink Sheets as an indicator of what a buyer paid or a seller
earned on a stock transaction consummated that day. From that baseline we
then adjusted the spammer's profit to include transaction costs (ranging
from 0 to 10, and also 100, round-trip basis points).84 While buying stock
82. See generally Baker & Stein, supra note 64.
83. As in Table 6, because we are dealing with the most extensively touted stocks, a given
stock may have several touting periods (groups) that have a high concentration of touting. This is
why the sample size is not equal to 50 percent of the sample size in Table 3.
84. We considered assuming that the spammer buys at the ask price on the day before
beginning his touting, and then liquidates at the bid price on the peak day of touting. However,
because Pink Sheets stocks are so thinly traded, the closing bid and ask data provided to us by

20081

SPAM WORKS

earlier might give a touter a better opportunity to buy low, keeping the
buying and selling tightly anchored to the touting might prove an even
more attractive strategy for touters because it reduces the time that their
money would be tied up in one stock. Initially, it might appear that
spammers would only be able to transact a small dollar amount at the
quoted prices because Pink Sheets stocks in general, and the targets of
touters in particular, tend to be illiquid. Our tracking of volume shows,
however, that liquidity is improved significantly during heavy tout periods.
Therefore, if the spammer (or the spammer's client) invested according to
this basic practice and are touted enough to create sufficient liquidity for a
given stock, returns in this Table suggest that his or her net worth would
increase approximately 4.29 percent in roughly two days, before
transaction costs. For example, assuming that spammer invested $1,000 in
each of the touted stocks in this sample, expected profits would be nearly
$18,018, before transaction costs. 8 5 If we were to assume a round-trip
transaction cost of 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 basis points, respective average profits
would decrease to $17,932.20, $17,846.40, $17,760.59, $17,674.79, or
$17,588.99. Even if we considered a round-trip transaction cost of 1
percent, a spammer's expected profit would remain significant, at
$13,727.91. Results are presented in the lower sub-panel of Table 9. Of
course, the volatility of returns (measured by standard deviation) is higher
for touted stocks. Depending on the touter's risk aversion level, the greater
return may more than compensate for bearing this added risk.
Now let us consider the returns to an investor who follows the advice
of a spammed tout. To follow this example, refer to Table 9 (sub-panel
labeled "peak to end + 2"). On average, if the victim were to purchase the
touted stock at the closing price on the peak day of touting and sell it at the
closing price two days after the touting window ends, he or she would lose
5.37 percent before transaction costs. Of course, we do not know that the
spammee would sell the stock two days after the touting ends, but casual
observation suggests that the Pink Sheets stocks do not return to the price
level on the day of peak touting for some time. In the same column, we can
see that, if each time the victim saw a touted stock he or she invested in a
randomly selected non-touted Pink Sheets stock, he or she would face

Pink Sheets cannot be associated reliably with a recorded transaction the following day.
Moreover, a spammer concerned about profits is likely to watch the market closely to determine
the best price at which to unload a position. This price is unlikely to be the previous day's closing
ask price. Therefore, if anything, by using closing prices, we might understate the profit to the
spammer.
85. On average, the spammer makes 4.29 percent on the 420 investment opportunities. It
follows that the spammer's net gain is equal to ($1,000*420* 1.0429) - (420*$1,000).
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marginally
lower idiosyncratic risk and, on average, would make 2.44
86
percent.

The above discussion accounts for spreads but does not include
brokerage fees, which are often flat for the entire transaction irrespective of
volume. 87 Spammers who buy and sell in large amounts of money can
calibrate the size of their trades accordingly to make sure that they profit
despite the broker's fee, while naive spammees who respond to touting
88
activity are unlikely to be sophisticated enough to minimize these fees.
Overall, our results imply that, in theory, a spanmee can profit by
forming a zero-cost portfolio that entails buying non-tout stocks and
shorting tout stocks each time he or she receives a spain-touting stock. This
strategy will likely have a high expected return (7.92 percent).89 Since Pink
Sheets stocks are so thinly traded, however, the spammee is at a
disadvantage compared to the spammer. He or she cannot as easily borrow
the stock necessary to short it and he or she does not have the same tools to
ensure liquidity when selling.

V. Policy Implications
In this Section, we briefly consider some policy implications of our
finding that stock prices can be successfully manipulated through spain. In
the United States, the prevailing model of consumer protection is that of

86. It is worth noting that 2.44 percent is an extremely large return for a typical control
sample during the period "peak to end + 2." This is evident by comparing this return to the
alternative control samples from NASDAQ. A comparison to the original Pink Sheets control

sample (Table 8 and Table 3, respectively) sheds some light on this issue. In particular, it appears
that most NASDAQ stocks have a very low average daily return (Table 8, Panel A). However,
when we examine returns to a NASDAQ-matched sample based on price and abnormal volume
(Table 8, Panel B), we see that the returns over this period are much more similar to, and in fact
larger than, those for the Pink Sheets control sample, which suggests that these returns may be
compensation for holding extremely low-priced, low-volume, and high-volatility stocks.
87. For example, E*TRADE offers flat fees as low as $6.99 per order, with no apparent
extra fees for trading additional shares of stocks, such as these, not listed on a national securities
exchange. See E*Trade Financial, https://us.etrade.com/e/t/ investingandtrading/stocks (last visited
Apr. 2, 2008).
88. See, e.g., Brad Barber & Terrance Odean, All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention and
News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors (EFA 2005 Moscow
Meetings Paper, Nov. 2006) (on file with Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law

Journal), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=460660.
89. This high expected return is likely at least partial compensation to investors for holding
relatively illiquid and small stocks. See, e.g., Michael Brennan & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam,
Market Microstructureand Asset Pricing: On the Compensationfor Illiquidity in Stock Returns, 41

J.FN. ECON. 341 (1996) (discussing illiquidity premiums).
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disclosure. 90 People who give advice to the public about stocks run the risk
of sanction by the federal SEC or its state counterparts if they fail to
disclose important facts, such personally holding a material interest in the
stocks. 91 Interestingly, much of the stock-touting spam we examined, such
as the sample provided in Figure 1, contained boilerplate disclosures, such
as the statement that the spammer had been compensated a certain amount
of money and shares of stock by a third party to send out an optimistic tout,
and that the spanmer (and the third party) were likely to be selling the very
stock touted contemporaneously with the tout itself.92 In order for a touter's
(or other entity recommending stocks) substantive claims to run afoul of
the federal SEC, they must appear both true and significant to a reasonable
person. 93 This standard turns out to exculpate much of the touting that takes
place in the spam we examine. Section X of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 prohibits "manipulative or deceptive devices" connected with
the sale of securities, and forged headers in the typical spam e-mail may
suffice under this standard. 94 The headers of such e-mails, however, are
usually sent by clearly fictional persons such that they are probably better
described as anonymous, rather than as fraudulent. 95 E-mails that purport to
be private e-mail between two parties, "accidentally" sent to the real target
90. See, e.g., Thomas M. Anderson, Stock-Scam Crackdown: Too Little, Too Late?,
http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/picks/archive/2007/
10,
2007,
Oct.
Kiplinger.com,
pickl010.htm (describing SEC disclosure requirements for companies); David L. Bacon,
Disclosure Requirementsfor Insurers Servicing ERISA Plans Are Spelled Out in US. Advisory
http://www.constructionweblinks.com/
Opinion, ConstructionWebLinks.com, Aug. 1, 2005,
disclosure
(describing
Resources/IndustryReports Newsletters/Aug_01 _2005/disc.html
requirements for insurance providers); Gardiner Harris, House Passes Bill Giving More Power to
the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
09/20/washington/20fda.html (discussing new disclosure requirements for drug manufacturers).
91. Some stock tout sparnmers have been prosecuted under § 17(b) of the Securities Act of
1933, on the basis that the spammers did not sufficiently disclose their financial interests. See,
e.g., In Re Sheret, 71 SEC Docket 1787, 2000 WL 210210, at *1 (Feb. 24, 2000). Walker &
Levine write that after the SEC began to bring enforcement cases, disclosure "markedly
improved." See Walker & Levine, supra note 15, at 425. Many of our recorded spam reflect that
so-called improvement.
92. See, e.g., infra Fig. 1.
93. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 157 (2002).
94. But cf Wong, supra note 9, at 10-17 (discussing how strict interpretation of the CANSPAM Act, which similarly prohibits falsity and deception in e-mail headers, has limited liability
for false and deceptive header information).
95. Professor Langevoort writes that "[t]he fact that a pseudonymous person on a website
says, even repeatedly, that he thinks that a stock is poised to gain an immense amount does not by
itself convey any seemingly reliable information. In other areas of antifraud litigation under the
securities laws, the courts have dismissed claims involving far more substantive assertions of
general optimism even when made by corporate insiders as immaterial as a matter of law."
Langevoort, supra note 93, at 157.
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through spam, however, might fall under Section X of the Act. Pink Sheets
CEO, R. Cromwell Coulson, has called attention to this type of market
manipulation, highlighted the inadequacy of such disclosures, and asked
the SEC to consider
rules that would make this type of stock-touting much
96
more difficult.

Given the prevalence of disclosure statements, the fact that so much
spam is blocked by spam filters, and the additional effort required for a
recipient to place an order, it is striking that heavy stock-touting actually
works. 97 If junk e-mail can find its way through ISPs and client-side filters
and reach the eyes of Internet users, what kind of response rate might be
expected? For spammers wanting recipients to read and then take some
action on the basis of an e-mail, even a very small response rate might be
enough to justify the modest effort and expense required to send it. 98 Our
data suggests a very low response rate for stock spam, which further
highlights the difficulties of combating these schemes using ex post
regulatory intervention.9 9 The effort required to vindicate the interests of a
few manipulated investors may not be worth it, and the amount of money
made on any given campaign may be modest enough to rate as a
correspondingly low priority on an enforcement agenda. Yet the problem
is significant because, as the increasing volume of stock-touting spam and
apparent number of campaigns suggests, spammers can make a great deal
of money over time in amounts that are small enough to individually
escape regulatory notice but large enough to be worth accumulating. This
suggests that structural solutions designed to lessen the impact of stocktouting spam may be a better preventative device than the traditional means
enforcement.

96. See Letter from R. Cromwell Coulson, CEO, Pink Sheets LLC, to Nancy M. Morris,
Secretary, S.E.C (Apr. 24, 2006), available at http://sec.gov/rules/ petitions/petn4-519.pdf.
97. See Milstead, supra note 19.
98. Studies suggest that children and teenagers are "easily manipulated" so are vulnerable to
marketing ploys like spam. See Rhoda H. Karpatkin, Toward a FairandJust Marketplacefor All
Customers: The Responsibilities of Marketing Professionals, 18 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING
118, 120-21 (1999). However, given that Barber & Odean found that the average age of the
principal account holder in their sample is approximately 50, it is unlikely that the people
Karpatkin is concerned about are responsible for the trading activity covered in this Article. See
Barber & Odean, supra note 24.
99. For China World Trade Corp., the most aggressively touted stock in our sample, our
data suggested that it had a total dollar value of trading activity of $36,842.43 on its heaviest day
of touting. If we suppose that the average investor invests $100, since dealers do not double count
orders, then we would expect approximately 360 people to be trading. If we further assume that
10 million spams are sent out for a given stock, then approximately 36 people per million are
responding. This is an extraordinarily low response rate, even as trading is noticeably affected.
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If disclosures meet the legal requirements and yet consumers are still
readily influenced, regulators might consider implementing more
aggressive and paternalistic applications of the law that stop short of
outright prohibiting such conflicts but go beyond simply requiring
disclosure. These initiatives could include requiring individuals to take
additional transactional steps in order to trade in penny stocks that are
similar to the written assurances that brokers require from their clients
before permitting them to pursue risky and complex investment activities,
such as writing uncovered options. Such steps might reduce the effect of
spam by creating a cooling-off period between the time a person receives
and potentially acts on a tout. Spammers, to be sure, might then take up
more sustained touting campaigns in order to maintain interest across such
cooling-off periods.
Disclosure has not been deemed sufficient to protect users in other
business sectors. For example, under most regulations it is typically not
legally sufficient for casinos to merely disclose and adhere to betting odds
in order to standardized games of chance to the public. 0 0 Instead,
regulators impose on casinos minimum payouts to the public for the games,
presuming that many members of the public would not shop among casinos
for the best odds if the casinos were instead free to set payouts.1° Just as
casinos must go beyond disclosure and provide minimum governmentmandated "fair" returns to those who gamble, 0 2 stock touters might be
prohibited from trying to move markets to their advantage using the wealth
of unsophisticated investors, even if they fully disclose their bias-in
essence, conceding the swindle they seek to accomplish in the text
alongside the touts that are central to the enterprise.
Finally, those who tout stocks using spam might be singled out for
enforcement under the CAN-SPAM Act, since our review of the spain e-

100. See
generally Roger
Dunstan,
Gambling in California (Jan.
1997),
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/crb97003.html#toc.
101. See, e.g., Mt. Dep't of Justice, Gambling Laws and Administrative Rules,
http://www.doj.mt.gov/gaming/lawsadministrativerules.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2008); Nv.
Gaming Comm'n & State Gaming Control Bd., Gaming Statutes and Regulations, available at
http://gaming.nv.gov/statsregs.htm. See also Cheryl A. Schmit, Only in Californiaand Haiti Do
Casinos Regulate Themselves: Consumers and Taxpayers Will Pay the Price for Government
Inaction, CaliforniaProgressReport.com (May 9, 2007), http://www.califomiaprogressreport.com/
2007/05/onlyin califor.html.
102. See generally Ed Grabianowski, How Casinos Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/casino2.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2008); STEVE BOURIE,
AMERICAN CASINO GUIDE 141-354 (2006) (discussing minimum payouts for casinos in different
states).
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mails indicated that
most fail to abide by CAN-SPAM's labeling and opt03
out requirements. 1
VI. Conclusion
Based on an archived database of touts drawn from 75,415 likely email tout messages drawn from over 1.8 million reports of spam, we
documented a significantly negative return following days of heavy spamtouting of a stock. We provided evidence of an average positive return over
the period that began the day before touting was initiated through the peak
day of touting activity. Volume responded positively and significantly to
touting. The data are consistent with the theory that spammers tout stocks
to increase demand and perhaps price enough to unload previously secured
positions at a profit. Selling pressure on the part of the spammer then
results in negative returns following intense touting. One of the
implications of these findings is that the investors who respond to heavy
touting are, on average, losing approximately 5.50 percent of their
investment over the few days that follow aggressive touting. When
aggregated across touts, the dollar value of this loss may be significant. The
fact that losses were greater for stocks that were touted most heavily
underscores the notion that heavy touting via spain can have an effect on
trading activity and returns. Our results are also in accord with a model in
which insiders who participate in highly illiquid markets may engage in
costly activities, such as making significant investments in investor
relations in order to liquidate their positions without significant price
impact. 104
Our analysis shows that spain works. Among its millions of recipients
are not only those who read it, but also those who act upon its advice. This
value of spamming creates a powerful counterbalance to regulatory and
technical efforts to contain it.

103. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7701-13 (West Supp. 2006). See also Wong, supra note 9, at 4-5
(discussing ability to prosecute spammers under CAN-SPAM's labeling and opt-out
requirements).
104. See Hong & Huang, supra note 8.
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VII. References
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on price, volume, and bid-ask spread data
for the stocks in our sample. Under the column "Stock," "All" refers to the full
sample of stocks in our analysis, "Touted" refers to those stocks that are touted in
an e-mail, and "Control" indicates randomly selected stocks from the Pink Sheets
exchange for which there are no touts in our sample. For each ticker, we obtained
the average of each variable (price, volume, etc.). The summary statistics in Table
1 are based on those averages. Under "# Tickers," we give the number of unique
companies in each sample. "Price" is closing price, "Volume" is share volume,
"Spread" is the ask price less the bid on the closing trade, and "% Spread" is
spread/price. "Difference" represents the difference in means between the Touted
and Control groups for each variable. "T-stat" refers to the Satterwhite t-statistic
testing whether each difference in means is significant. All data is from January
2004 through July 2005.
Variable
Price

Volume

Spread

% Spread

Stock
All
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
All
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
All
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
All
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

# Tickers
829
304
525

829
304
525

814
292
522

812
291
521

Mean
0.87
0.67
0.99
-0.32
-3.19
2,471.32
2,876.40
2,236 75
639.65
7.84
0.10
0.07
0.11
-0.04
-3.08
0.25
0.19
0.28
-0.09
-5.05

Median
0.25
030
022

St Dev
1.64
0.92
1.93

Min
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max
12.60
5.68
12.60

2,766.60
3,157.09
2,370.32

1,255.5
1,001.0
1,327.0

0.82
0.82
355

5,110.33
4,740.29
5,11033

003
0.03
003

0.23
0.13
027

0.00
000
0.00

2.99
1.51
2.99

0.17
0 14
0.19

0.29
0.17
0.34

0.00
0.00
0.00

3.09
1 37
309
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Table 2: Initial Evidence on the Relevance of Touting for Trading Activity
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the touted and control stocks in our
sample both for days that experience a tout and days that do not. Panel A gives
results defining dollar value of trading activity as closing price multiplied by share
volume. Panel B provides data in terms of dollar value of abnormal trading
activity, which is measured by closing price multiplied by abnormal share volume.
Abnormal share volume for each stock was obtained by subtracting the stock's
mean volume over the sample period from its daily dollar volume, standardized by
its mean volume. If a "No" appears under the column labeled "Tout Day," then no
stock is touted on that day. Similarly, if "Yes" appears in the column, then there is
a stock tout on that day. The column labeled "Stock" indicates whether the stocks
for which the summary statistics are calculated are touted or control stocks. "N"
gives the number of unique tickers in each group, "Pr*Vol" is the average of share
price multiplied by share volume, "Pr*AbnVol" is the mean of price multiplied by
abnormal share volume, "St Dev" is the standard deviation of Pr*Vol (Panel A) or
Pr*AbnVol (Panel B), and "Percent" indicates the proportion of times that the
relevant type of stock (touted or control) is the most actively traded stock on the
relevant day (touted or not touted). For the averages, "*" denotes significance at
the a = 5% level. All data is from January 2004 through July 2005.
Panel A- Dollar Value of Trading Activity
Tout Day
No
No

Stock
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

N
20
446

Pr*AbnVol
41,101.80*
56,152.06*
15,050.26
7.21

St Dev
8,50838
18,151.89

Percent
0.04
0.96

Yes
Yes

Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

260
114

11,118.84*
13,975.80*
2,856.96
2.18

10,853.53
11,982.90

0.70
0.30

Panel B. Dollar Value of Abnormal Trading Activity
Tout Day
No
No

Stock
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

N
171
295

Pr*AbnVol
64.48*
53.16*
-11 31
-2 16

St Dev
53.45
56.52

Percent
0.37
0.63

Yes
Yes

Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

278
96

2.90*
4.38*
1.48
1.86

4.30
7.38

0.74
0.26
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Table 3: "Group Level" Summary Statistics Around Tout Days
Table 3 presents "group-level" summary statistics on the variables in our
sample around days on which there is a stock tout. A group is defined as a period
of touting activity with no more than 5 consecutive days without a tout. The peak
day is defined as the day within a group with the heaviest touting. "Beg - 1 to
Peak" represents the period from the day before the beginning of the group of touts
through the peak day of touting within each group. "Peak Day" is the day within
each group with the heaviest touting, and "Peak to End + 2" represents the period
from the Peak Day of touting through two days after the touting within each group
ends. "N" is the number of ticker-groups, "MPR" represents the average of the
holding period midpoint return over the relevant period, and "AbnVol" is the
average of abnormal volume across stocks, where abnormal volume is measured as
a stock's daily dollar volume less its mean volume over the sample period,
standardized by its mean volume. For the averages, "" denotes significance at the
a = 5% level. All data are from January 2004 through July 2005.
Group-Level Results
Stock
Peak day
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to Peak
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Peak to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

N

MPR

St Dev

AbnVol

St Dev

680
481

00014
00038
-0.0023
-0.36

0.1345
0.0899

0.6453*
-0.0532
0.6985
4.23

3.7001
I 8446

680
495

0.0083*
0.0013
0.007
1.74

00821
00563

0.4028*
-0.0299
04327
4 49

2.1187
1.1573

680
496

-0.0085
0.0021
-0.0106
-3 55

0.0547
0.0472

0.5206*
0.0682
0.4524
3.86

2.2672
1.7492

680
497

-0.0031
00016
-0.0047
-1.84

0.0494
00383

0.4410*
0.0429
0.3981
427

1.8693
1.3277
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Table 4: Impact of Touting on Returns & Volume for Full Sample
For all stocks in our sample, Table 4 gives results for a pooled crosssectional, time-series generalized least squares regression for the entire sample
period 2004 only, and 2005 only. The left-hand side of the Table refers to the
entire sample period, the middle section gives results for observations from 2004
only, and the right-hand side gives results for observations from 2005 only. Panel
A uses midpoint return as the dependent variable and Panel B gives results using
abnormal volume as the dependent variable. Abnormal volume is measured as a
stock's daily dollar volume less its mean volume over the sample period,
standardized by its mean volume. "Int" denotes intercept and "tstk" is a dummy
variable that takes on the value 1 if the stock is touted and zero otherwise. The
variable "#touts" represents the number of touts on a given date, and "cum5" is a
variable that represents the cumulative effect of touting in the 5 days after touting
occurs. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering. The variable "# tickers" gives
the number of unique tickers used in each regression.
Panel A. Dependent Variable = Daily Return
All

Est

Error

Pr > I z I

2004

Est

Error

Pr > IZ 1

2005

Est

Error

Pr > I Z

Int

00099

00011

<.0001

tnt

00237

00056

<.0001

tnt

00057

00041

0.1607

Tstk

-00090

0.0077

00132

02094

0 0014

00006

00136

00014
00003

0.3448

0 0004

tstk
#touts

00015

0.001

tstk
#touts

-00166

#touts

02412
00093

00003

0.3663

Cum5

-0 0004

0.0001

< 0001

cum5

-0 0004

0.0001

< 0001

cum5

-0.0003

0.0001

00008

# tickers

798

71

628

Panel B Dependent Vanable = Abnormal Volume
All

Est

Error

Pr > I Z I

2004

Est

Error

Pr> IZ 1

2005

Est

Error

Pr > I ZI

let

0.8626

00034

<.0001

tnt

05985

0.018

<.0001

tnt

0.5057

0.0857

< 0001

Tstk

-00021

00243

0.931

tstk

-0.0071

0.0414

0.8631

tstk

00027

0.014

08479

#touts

0.0088

0.0042

00372

#touts

00068

00061

02703

#touts

0.0116

0.0048

0.0166

Cum5

00023

0.001

00198

cum5

00011

00014

04125

cum5

0004

0.0013

00027

#uckers

792

706

624
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Table 5: Impact of Touting on Returns & Volume for Touted Stocks Only
For touted stocks only, Table 5 gives results for a pooled cross-sectional,
time-series generalized least squares regression for the entire sample period, 2004
only, and 2005 only. Results are presented in the left-hand side, middle, and righthand side of the Table, respectively. Panel A gives results using midpoint return as
the dependent variable and Panel B gives results using abnormal volume as the
dependent variable. Abnormal volume is measured as a stock's daily dollar volume
less its mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its mean volume.
The variable "Int" denotes intercept, "#touts" represents the number of touts on a
given date, and "cum5" represents the cumulative effect of touting in the five days
after touting occurs. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering. The variable
"#tickers" gives the number of unique stocks used in each regression.

All
Int
#touts

Est
00143
00009

Error
0
00004

Pr >1Z 1
< 0001
0022

cum5

-00004

00001

<.0001
289

# tickers

All
lnt
#touts

Est
0.342
00088

cum5

00024

# tickers

Error
0
00043
0001

PanelA Dependent Variable = Daily Return
2004
Est
Error
Pr >1Z 1
tnt
00208
0
< 0001
#touts
0.0012
00006
0.0349
cum5

-00004

00001

< 0001
251

2005
tnt
#touts

Est
00031
00003

Error
0.0044
0.0003

Pr >1Z I
04797
03421

cum5

-00003

0.0001

00007

Panel B Dependent Vanable = Abnormal Volume
Pr >1Z 1
2004
Est
Error
Pr >1Z 1
2005
< 0001
mt
05876
00001
<.0001
int
00378
#touts
0007
00062
02618
#touts
0.013
cum5
0.0015
00014
0266
cum5
288

250

269

Est
04541
00115

Error
00667
0.0048

00037

00013

Pr >1
Z I
< 0001
00166
0.0046
266
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Table 6: Touting Activity Quintiles
In Table 6, five quintiles were created based on daily touting activity.
Quintile 5 represents the stock-days with the heaviest amount of touting. The data
are then divided into the successive quintiles based on touting activity, with
Quintile 1 representing the stock-days with the lightest amount of touting. Panel A
gives the sample size for each quintile (based on stock-days), the average number
of touts, average return, and average dollar value of trading activity (normal and
abnormal) for each quintile. Values are calculated on tout days only. "Vol" is share
volume and "AbnVol" is abnormal share volume, measured as a stock's daily
dollar volume less its mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its
mean volume. Panel B presents group-level summary statistics on the variables in
our sample for the tickers in our sample that have the highest amount of touting
activity around days that experience a tout. A group is defined as a period of
touting during which there are no more than five days without a tout. "N" is the
number of ticker-groups, and "Group Ret" is the holding period return (calculated
from spread midpoints) over the relevant period. The Peak Day is defined as the
day within a group with the heaviest touting. "Beg - 1 to Peak" represents the
period from the day before the beginning of the group of touts through the peak
day of touting within each group. "Peak to End + 2" represents the period from the
peak day of touting through two days after the group of touts ends. For the
averages in Panel B, "*" denotes significance at the a = 5% level. All data are from
January 2004 through July 2005.
PanelA Summary Statistics byQuitile
Quintile
1
2
3
4
5
DiffQ5-QI
T-stat

Stock
Peak day
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to Peak
Touted
Control
Difference
T-Stat
Peak to End +2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to End +2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

Stock-Days
847
367
465
363
404

Avg Touts
1
2
381
83
3144

Ret
-0.41
1
-0.53
024
079
120
1 26
Panel B Quintile Group-Level Results

Pr*Vol
1,48451
1,76344
2,01044
2,22050
3,43920
1,95469
500

Pr*AbnVol
11079
30889
40468
50365
65163
54084
1 84

N

Group Ret

St Dev

Abn Vol

St Dev

306
481

0.0077
-00058
00135
1.45

0 1505
00784

0.3630-01237
0.4867
4.77

1 5510
1 1029

306
496

0.0296
-00046
00342
2.12

02605
0 1390

0.1863-00368
0.2230
2.72

1 0783
1.2062

306
496

-00619
00142
-00605
-251

02529
0 5939

0.28130
-0.0084
0.2897
4.08

1.0032
0.9320

306
500

-00454
00151
-0 0605
-1 89

02976
06072

0 233500005
0.2330
3.57

0.8976
08994
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Table 7: Industry Classifications
Table 7 shows the distribution of the touted stocks in our sample across
industries, as determined by 2-digit SIC code. The 2-digit SIC code is given in the
leftmost column, the industry description is provided in the middle column, and the
percentage of stocks in our sample falling within the relevant industry is given in
the rightmost column. The sample period is January 2004 through July 2005.
SIC
73
48
87
28
36
13
20
79
80
10
38
35
49
62
23
39
14
27
67
75
29
37
65
78
15
17
34
64
81
82
12
40
50
51
57
60
72

Industry Description
Business Services
Communications
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services
Chemicals and Allied Products
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer
Equipment
Oil and Gas Extraction
Food and Kindred Products
Amusement and Recreation Services
Health Services
Metal Mining
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics and Similar Materials
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
Mining and Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries
Holding and Other Investment Offices
Automotive Repair, Services, and Parking
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries
Transportation Equipment
Real Estate
Motion Pictures
Building Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders
Construction Special Trade Contractors
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment
Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service
Legal Services
Educational Services
Coal Mining
Railroad Transportation
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods
Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods
Home Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment Stores
Depository Institutions
Personal Services

Percent
26 63%
7.05%
7.05%
6.27%
5 48%
5.22%
4.18%
4.18%
4.18%
3 13%
2 87%
2.35%
2.09%
2.09%
1.83%
1 83%
1.31%
1.31%
1.31%
1 31%
1 04%
0.78%
0.78%
0.78%
0.52%
0.52%
0 52%
0.52%
0.52%
0.52%
0.26%
0.26%
0.26%
0.26%
0.26%
0.26%
0.26%
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Table 8: Alternative Control Groups
Table 8 presents summary statistics on the variables in our sample around
days that experience a tout. Panel A contains group-level results, with control firms
from the smallest decile of NASDAQ stocks matched by 2-digit SIC industry code.
Panel B contains group-level results, with the control firms matched by price and
abnormal volume, from the smallest decile of NASDAQ stocks. A group is defined
as a period with fewer than five days without a tout. The Peak Day is defined as
the day within a group with the heaviest touting. "N" is the number of tickergroups, "MPR" is the average daily return calculated from spread midpoints, and
"AbnVol" is abnormal volume, measured as a stock's daily dollar volume less its
mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its mean volume. "Beg - I to
Peak" represents the period from the day before the beginning of the group of touts
through the day of the tout. "Peak to End + 2" represents the day of heaviest
touting through the two days after the group of touts ends. For the means,
"*"denotes significance at the a = 5% level. Our sample period is January 2004
through July 2005.
Panel A- NASDAQ Control Stocks Matched by 2 - Digit
SIC Code
Stock
Peak day
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to Peak
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Peak to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

N

MPR

St Dev

AbnVol

St Dev

680
536

0.0014
-0.0030
0.0044
0.81

0.1345
0.0385

06453
-0.1080
0.7533
4.7

3.7001
1.7339

680
549

0.0083*
-0.0028
0.0112
3.31

0.0821
0.0279

0.4028*
0.0355
0.3673
2.93

2 3027
2.2378

680
548

-0.0085
0.0004
-0.0090
-3 77

0.0547
0.0263

0.5206*
0.2109
0.3097
1.6

2.5622
4.0439

680
549

-00031
-00004
-0.0026
-1.25

0.0494
0.0217

0.4410*
0.2038
02372
1 51

2.1423
3.2814
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Panel B: NASDAQ Control Stocks Matched by Price and Abnormal Volume
Stock
Peak day
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to Peak
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Peak to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-I to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

N

MPR

St Dev

AbnVol

St Dev

680
91

0.0014
-0.0164
0.0178
1.74

0.1345
0.0844

06453
2 0333*
-1.3880
-1 40

3.7001
9.3911

680
173

0.0083*
-0.0056
0.0139
3.49

00821
0.0321

0.4028*
0.3586
0.0442
0 16

2.1187
3.5872

680
260

-0.0085
0 0071'
-0.0156
-4.29

0.0547
0.0481

0.5206*
1.0302*
-0.5095
-2.00

2.2672
3 8657

680
260

-0.0031
0 0045*
-0.0076
-2.66

0.0494
0.0341

0.4410"
0.8798*
-0.4388
-2.04

1.8693
3.2731
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Table 9: Touting Strategy
Table 9 presents summary statistics on returns and volume assuming a
strategy that takes advantage of the most effective touting strategy. Results are
from the group-level. Control stocks are determined in the same way as in Table 1.
A group is defined as a period with fewer than five days without a tout. The Peak
Day is defined as the day within a group with the heaviest touting. "Beg - 1 to
Peak" represents the period from the day before the beginning of the group of touts
through the day of the tout. "Peak to End + 2" represents day of heaviest touting
through the two days after the group of touts ends. "N" is the number of tickergroups. "HPW'represents the average return for the group-level results, and is
calculated by buying and selling at the closing price on the specified days.
"AbnVol" is abnormal volume, measured as a stock's daily dollar volume less its
mean volume over the sample period, standardized by its mean volume. In the
lower sub-panel of the Table, we present the hypothetical profit (in dollars) to a
spammer who invests $1000 in each touted stock on the day before the peak day of
touting and liquidates his position on the peak day of touting, assuming round-trip
transaction costs ranging from 0 to 100 basis points. Our sample period is January
2004 through July 2005.
Stock
Peak day
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-l to Peak
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Peak to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat
Beg-i to End+2
Touted
Control
Difference
T-stat

N

HPR

StDev

AbnVol

StDev

% Spread

StDev

420
297

0.003
0.0077
-0.0047
-0.54

0.14
0.0934

0.8278
-0.0173
0.8451
3.52

4.3115
1 9845

0.1335
0.2642
-0.1308
-6.46

0 1683
0.3188

420
305

0.0429
0.0063
0.0366
2 33

0.2741
0.1439

04898
-0.0160
0.5058
3.67

2.4548
1.1958

0.1381
0.2574
-0.1193
-6.22

01497
0.3098

420
306

-0.0537
0.0132
-0.0669
-3.58

0.2482
0.2491

0.6266
00475
0.5791
3.37

2.6578
1.9771

0 1327
0.2587
-0.1260
-6 52

0.1389
0.3166

420
306

-0.0203
0.0112
-00315
-1.46

0.3179
0.264

0.5233
0.0315
0.4918
36

2.1987
1.4807

0.1344
0.2582
-0 1238
-650

0.134
0.3132

One-Way Cost

0

1

2

3

4

5

50

Profit

18018

179322

17846.4

17760.59

17674.79

17588.99

13727.91
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Figure 1: Spam E-mail Touting Stock
Figure 1 gives an example of spam e-mail touting a stock (CWTD).

From nanas-subacybernothing.org Thu Mar 1t 10:14:16 2004 X-Persona:
Received: from broadtech.co.nz (d233-64-140-225.dnv.wideopenwest.com
C64.233.225.140)) by mailcyber.law.harvard.edu with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail
Version 5.5.2653.13) id 1Y7PFFVG; Thu, 18 Mar 2004 10:13:29 -0500
Message- ID:
From: -Johnathon I. HathawayTo: zittrainacyber.law.harvard.edu
Subject- Strong Buy Alert: CWTD
mySzupb
Date: Thu, 18 Mar 2004 13:09 47 .0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html

Service

Financial Insiders Report
Mid-Week Report
It you loved your 900 percent
galns on our stock pick last week, we think our next pick,
"
World Trade Corp. "CWTD , will do even better II

China

Strong-Buy Alert I
"Breaking News In the Previous 2 weeks*
CWTD Makes Application to list on Amex
China World Trade Corp Signs Letter of Intent to Acquire Controlling Stake of Guangdong Huahao
Industries Holdings Limited
China World Trade Corp. ticker: "CWTD"
CHINA WORLD TRADE CORP.
Symbol: CWTD OTC.BB
Pdce $4.80 <THISWAS PROFILED AT 1.50 2 WEEKS AGO>
Shares out: 16Million
Market Capitalization: $ 19Million
Significant Revenue Growth in 2004
Average PE Industry: 30x
Rating: Strong Buy
7 days trading target: $0.50
30 day trading target:
7.50

Investment Outlook
I

.

.

.

..

"' ,

'

,
.

.

5.•
•I .

*

.

.

•

• DESTOP LOCAL CORPORATE
AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT

C IN TIlE LAST TVENTY YEARS, THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO CHINA HAS
INCREASED FROM 0.92 BILl.ION USDIN 1983TO 52.74 BILLION USD IN 2004
'I CW rI IS FIRMLY POSITIONED TO VASTLY EXPAND ITS MARKETING AND ACQUISITION
STRATEGIES AND CAPITALIZE ON ASIA'S MULTI-BILLION IO)LLAR EMERGING MItARKET.
A CWID HAS JUST MADE THE APPIACATION TO LIST ON THE AMEX!!!
-1 CHINA WORI.D TRADE CORP SIGNS LETI'ER OF INTENT TO ACQUIRE CONTIROLLING STAKE
OF GUANGI)ONG tUAI! AOINDUSTRIES HOLDINGS LIMI IED

CWTD is our PLAY OF THE MONTH stock pick.
Here area few simplereasons
whyonewould own ChinaWorld TradeCorp
...

The

The Company's businessmodel consists of three major components -- The World Trade Center business,
value-added services, and strategic investnents
C China World TradeCorporation established
the frst World Trade Center m theprovince of Guangzhou
(Canton) in the year2002 andstartedthe commerciol
operation
at thebeginnng of 2003. This significant eventwas
coveredto detailon CNN ASIA.
- With therecenttragic eventsof 9-Il, thenameWorld TradeCenter has instant global recognition, andstands
for unity, strength andprosperity throughout
theworlds topeconomyleaders
J ChinaWorld TradeCorpSignsLetter of Intentto Acquire Controling Stakeof Canttgdong Huahaondusties
Holdings Linmted
I CWTD's busioess potentialis built upontheopportunity createdbytheinternational tradeof China
Don't be sorry next week that you forgot to buy this onel
China World Trade Corp. Is uniquely positioned and capitalizing on the rapidly expanding asian
marketisl
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Figure 2: Returns to Touted and Control Stocks
Figure 2 plots average daily returns and cumulative returns for touted (Touted
Ret, Touted CumRet respectively) and control stocks (Control Ret, Control
CumRet) in an 11-day window around a stock tout (where day 0 marks the event
day when a stock is touted). Returns are calculated from daily closing prices. Event
days are plotted on the X-axis and returns (in decimals) are given on the Y-axis.
The sample period is January 2004 through July 2005.

20081

SPAM WORKS

Figure 3: Abnormal Volume of Trading in Touted and Control Stocks
Figure 3 plots average daily abnormal volume and cumulative abnormal
volume for touted (Tout AbnVol, Tout CumAbnVol respectively) and control
stocks (Cont AbnVol, Cont CumAbnVol) in an 11-day window around a stock tout
(where day 0 marks the event day when a stock is touted). Abnormal volume is
measured as a stock's daily dollar volume less its mean volume (over the sample
period) standardized by its mean volume. Event days are plotted on the X-axis and
abnormal dollar volume is given on the Y-axis. The sample period is January 2004
through July 2005.
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Figure 4: Trading Activity for Touted Stocks Grouped by Tout Volume
Figure 4 plots average daily trading activity (Pr*Vol) and average daily
abnormal trading activity (Pr*AbnVol) for stocks in each touting activity quintile.
Quintiles are determined by ranking stock-days by touting activity. Quintile 5
(Quintile 1) has the most (least) touting activity. The quintile is plotted on the Xaxis. Average dollar value of trading activity (left Y-Axis) is the price multiplied
by share volume. Average dollar value of abnormal trading activity (right Y-Axis)
is the price multiplied by abnormal volume, where abnormal volume is measured
as a stock's daily dollar volume less its mean volume (over the sample period)
standardized by its mean volume. The sample period is January 2004 through July
2005.
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